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Non-Territorial Autonomy and Political Community in 
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 
 
David J. Smith  
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow 
 
The last two decades have seen the adoption of laws on non-territorial autonomy 
(NTA) by several states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as well as debates 
on the applicability of this concept to other countries of the region. This 
development has in turn elicited a growing interest from international 
organisations in the potential of NTA as a modality of minority rights provision 
in the New Europe. In spite of this interest, relatively little is known about the 
practical implementation of NTA within this setting and its reception by ethno-
national minorities and majorities alike. This article offers a preliminary 
comparative analysis of debates and practices around NTA in four countries— 
Hungary, Romania Estonia and Russia—and seeks to link these cases to broader 
Central and East European-focused debates on state and nation-building, 
democratisation and participation in public life. By way of conclusion, it makes a 
case for further research on NTA ‘from the ground up’, focusing more squarely 
on the everyday practice of autonomy from a minority perspective and how this 
might inform and deepen understandings of minority agency within current 
processes of political community building in CEE and—ultimately—beyond. 
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The past two decades have witnessed a significant revival of interest in the concept of 
non-territorial autonomy (NTA), as part of academic and policy discussions on an 
evolving European minority rights regime (Van der Stoel, 1999: 172; Kymlicka, 
2008; Decker, 2008; Scholsem, 2008; Smith, 2008; Osipov, 2010; Smith, 2010).
1
 The 
NTA dimension to these discussions has for the most part been driven by 
developments on the ground in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
where legislation based on this model has been adopted by several countries and 
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actively discussed in several more.
2
 Drawing on available secondary literature and 
some initial analysis of domestic political debates, this article examines debates and 
practices around NTA in Hungary, Romania, Estonia, and the Russian Federation. 
The four cases offer particularly interesting points of comparison and contrast as part 
of an overall discussion of the concept. In each case the article seeks to determine 
why and by whom NTA has been advocated and applied, how it has been received by 
representatives of ethno-national majorities and minorities, and how the experience of 
NTA within these particular state contexts can be situated within broader debates 
linking minority rights to processes of state and nation-building, democratisation, and 
European integration. The article concludes with some suggestions for further 
research on NTA ‘from the ground up’, focusing more squarely on the practice of 
autonomy and how this might inform and deepen understandings of minority agency 
within current processes of political community building in CEE and—ultimately—
beyond. 
 
1. Institutional legacies in Central and Eastern Europe as a background to NTA 
All modern European states have, at different times and in differing degrees, had to 
contend with issues arising from ethno-cultural diversity amongst their populations. 
Liberal democracy has increasingly sought to address these issues through the 
principle of minority rights, which deems all citizens equal regardless of ethnic origin, 
but which also grants ethnic minorities certain positive rights relating to their distinct 
culture.
3
 The practice of minority rights has, however, brought into focus what Aviel 
Roshwald terms ‘the dilemma of ethnocultural diversity’, i.e. how to ensure that 
cultural recognition does not undermine overall societal cohesion or the integrity of 
the state (Roshwald, 2008).  
This dilemma, one can say, has proved especially acute in the region commonly 
termed CEE. In the western part of Europe, debates around the political management 
of ethnic diversity are (generally speaking) of fairly recent historical provenance, and 
arose within the framework of what were already well-established unitary nation-
states with relatively coherent and overarching societal cultures. In CEE, by contrast, 
managing ethnic diversity has been a central preoccupation from the very outset of the 
modern state-building process. Within this region, movements for national self-
determination originally took hold within the context of empire. Driven by disaffected 
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new intellectual strata amongst subject peoples, they were typically grounded in 
identification with an ethnic community rather than with established political 
institutions (Hroch, 1985; Roshwald, 2001: 5; Brubaker, et al., 2006: 27-46). In the 
case of larger, more compactly settled populations, nationalist demands were soon 
linked to particular territories, which, however imprecisely defined, were deemed to 
be the national homeland of the group in question (Petronis, 2007). This territorial 
frame of reference was, however, inherently problematic given the ethnically-mixed 
patterns of settlement within the region, which meant that however one drew the lines, 
ethno-national and political boundaries would never be fully congruent. In some 
cases, indeed, particular nationalities were so dispersed in terms of settlement that it 
would be hard to envisage that their demands might be satisfied to any degree at all by 
territorial means. 
It was this contention that led Karl Renner and Otto Bauer to propound their 
original theory of NTA back at the turn of the twentieth century. Arguing that 
demands for national self-determination had to be accommodated within an ethno-
federalist conception of statehood, they insisted that national rights (understood 
primarily as the right to maintain and practise one’s distinct culture) should not be 
allocated to particular territorial sub-units of the state, but rather to collectivities of 
individual citizens who had freely affiliated themselves to a national register. This 
national register would form the basis for the election of national-cultural self-
governments, public bodies which would assume responsibility for schooling and 
other cultural matters of specific concern to the particular ethnicity and would, inter 
alia, have the right to levy additional taxes on those who had signed up to the relevant 
national register (Renner, 2005; Bauer, 2000). This approach was diametrically 
opposed to the then-established nation-state concept based on cultural homogenisation 
of political space. Instead, Renner and Bauer envisaged the state as a shared territorial 
space inhabited by autonomously-organised ethno-national groups. Their reasoning 
was that if each group could cater for its own specific cultural needs, this would leave 
the overall state government and territorially-based local administrations to focus on 
more ‘nationally neutral’ matters of concern to all citizens (Bauer, 2000: 284-8).  
The ‘Austro-Marxist’ model of NTA proved to be highly influential amongst 
democratising movements in both the Habsburg and the Russian empires during the 
early years of the twentieth century, but was ultimately marginalised as these 
multinational states collapsed under the combined pressures of World War and 
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Revolution during 1917-20. Renner and Bauer’s thinking was, however, to a large 
extent vindicated by the nature of the new CEE that arose on the basis of the western-
brokered peace settlement and the Bolshevik assumption of power in much of the 
territory formerly occupied by the Russian Empire. The doctrine of national self-
determination may have been proclaimed as one of the cornerstones of the peace 
settlement, but it was largely disregarded in the case of nationalities such as the 
Germans, Hungarians, and Galician Ukrainians. Where the victorious Western Allies 
did uphold this doctrine, they applied it on a territorial basis, seeking to give selective 
ethno-national groups ‘a state of their own’.  
This notion of exclusive ethnic ownership over territory was fundamentally at 
odds with the plural society character of the new states, all of which contained 
substantial ethno-national minority populations. The application of the unitary nation-
state template gave rise to a ‘nationalising state’ logic in most if not all of the 
countries of inter-war Central Europe, whereby belonging to a particular ethno-
national minority was seen as incompatible with belonging to state political 
communities defined in narrowly ethnic terms. Perceptions of minorities as potentially 
detrimental to state sovereignty and integrity were accentuated further in the case of 
groups (such as Germans and Hungarians) which could be linked by virtue of their 
ethnicity to a neighbouring state that harboured irredentist political elements. This 
securitised ‘triadic nexus’ of state, minority and external homeland nationalisms 
became a major source of instability and conflict within inter-war central Europe, 
contributing to the disaster that befell the region after 1933 (Brubaker, 1996: 55-107). 
Interestingly, one exception to the rule (at least during the democratic 1920s) was to 
be found in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: established outside the 
framework of the peace settlement, these all established forms of non-territorial 
autonomy that were deemed successful in mitigating inherited tensions between the 
new states and their minorities (Smith and Hiden, 2012).  
In the case of the USSR, the Soviet regime also sought to manage the 
multinational legacy of empire on a territorial basis. Guided by the maxim ‘national in 
form, socialist in content’, it allocated a designated ‘homeland’ to each of the largest 
ethnic groups living within the Soviet state. However, this was not a democratic 
federalism, but the practice of an authoritarian one-party state, and its territorially-
based approach could not accommodate the full spectrum of ethno-national diversity 
that existed within the borders of the USSR. For instance, in the case of the Russian 
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Republic (itself configured along federal lines), only 41 of the 127 officially 
acknowledged nationalities had territorial autonomy, leaving the other 86 without any 
form of recognition. Even where territorial autonomy had been granted, a significant 
proportion of the group in question typically resided outside the borders of the 
designated ‘ethnic homeland’. On the basis of this, Cristiano Codagnone and Vassily 
Filippov have estimated, in an article on the post-Soviet nationality question, that 
‘only about 10 million individuals in Russia, out of the 27 million non-ethnic 
Russians, could benefit from the protection offered by the principle of territorial 
autonomy’ (Codagnone and Filippov, 2000: 26).4  
Coupled with the recording of personal ethnicity within passports, Soviet policy 
thus served to ‘[institutionalise] both territorial-political and personal-ethnocultural 
models of nationhood as well as the tension between them’ (Brubaker, 1996: 45). The 
only group to benefit from clearly-defined extra-territorial national rights under the 
Soviet system were ethnic Russians, who were encouraged to identify with the USSR 
as their homeland. The status of Russian as the language of international 
communication within the USSR meant that Russians were able to live and work 
within ‘non-Russian’ republics without necessarily having to learn the local language. 
Once again, however, this system proved to be a source of tension in the 1980s when 
the political space was opened up for the expression of ‘ethno-regionalism’ within 
individual union and autonomous national republics.  
 
2. European minority rights and the ‘return’ of NTA 
The aforementioned institutional legacies have profoundly shaped debates over the 
political management of ethno-diversity both within post-Communist central Europe 
and within the new states established following the demise of the USSR. It would 
clearly be inappropriate to draw too close a parallel between inter-war and 
contemporary CEE. Nevertheless, visible trends towards the ethnicisation of politics 
within a post-Communist setting, coupled with the open conflict and bloodshed that 
occurred in former Yugoslavia and parts of the USSR, meant that the region quickly 
became the main focus of discussions on how to enact a post-Cold War European 
minority rights framework under the auspices of international organisations such as 
the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Union.  
The minority rights agenda in relation to the region has been informed partly by 
a concern to promote democratisation, social justice, and equal opportunities to 
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participate in public life. The issue of participation has, for instance, been a particular 
concern in relation to CEE’s largest ‘stateless’ minority, the Roma, living in dispersed 
fashion across several countries of the region and subject to increased socio-economic 
marginalisation and discrimination within the context of post-Communist 
transformation (Vermeersch and Ram, 2009). In nearly all cases, however, the 
discourse of minority rights has had to contend with the simultaneous and competing 
demands of state and nation-building processes which prioritise stability, 
standardisation, and strong central authority over devolution and cultural pluralism. In 
a context where ‘stateness’ is often not considered a fait accompli, ruling elites have 
been ill-disposed to agree to the kind of far-reaching territorial autonomy that has 
been accorded to various national minorities living in western democracies over the 
past half-century. Alarmed by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, international 
organisations have also been concerned that minority political demands elsewhere in 
the region might prove to undermine existing state borders and prejudice the stability 
of the region as a whole.  
It is this preoccupation with stability—I would argue—that does much to 
explain the heightened interest in and practice of non-territorial autonomy across the 
region during the past two decades: if minority demands can be de-territorialised, the 
reasoning goes, they will be easier to contain and thus pose less of a threat to state 
integrity. Whether NTA actually works from the point of view of particular minorities 
or helps to boost their representation and participation in public life has arguably been 
a secondary consideration.
5
 In what follows I examine debates and practices around 
NTA in four countries, using the analytical lenses of both stabilisation and 
democratisation.  
 
3. NTA in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: debates and practices  
3.1 Non-territorial autonomy in Hungary 
In looking at the revival of NTA within CEE, it seems logical to start with Hungary, 
which was the first state to espouse the concept following the fall of Communism, and 
which has since developed what is by far the most comprehensive framework in this 
area. Adopted in July 1993, Hungary’s Act LXXVII on National and Ethnic 
Minorities granted the right to cultural autonomy for thirteen ‘indigenous’ national 
minorities (Bulgarians, Greeks, Croatians, Poles, Germans, Armenians, Roma, 
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Romanians, Carpatho-Rusyns, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Ukrainians), who could 
trace their presence in the country back at least one hundred years (Vizi, 2009: 21). 
While enumerating ethnic affiliation is always an imprecise art, the share of 
Hungary’s population belonging to national minorities is small by regional standards. 
While some say that the actual figure is as high as 10%, the 2001 census gave a figure 
of 4.34% (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2012: 3). With the 
partial exception of the Roma minority concentrated in the country’s north-east, these 
minority populations live in a territorially dispersed fashion, meaning that an NTA 
law appears well-suited to the particular context of Hungary (Krizsán, 2000: 250, fn. 
4). 
Hailed by the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFC) as an ‘ambitious law 
making it possible for the [… recognised …] national minorities to participate in 
decision-making processes’ (ACFC, 2010), the 1993 Cultural Autonomy Act attracted 
widespread international attention and acclaim. However, it subsequently underwent a 
significant redrafting in 2005, since when it was superseded altogether by Act 
CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Minorities, adopted as part of the process of 
drawing up Hungary’s new constitution.    
If numerical density alone is taken as a guide, then the initial cultural autonomy 
law can be seen as having been hugely effective, with no less than 1200 minority 
cultural self-governments established during the decade after 1993 (Dobos, 2007: 
465). The system of minority self-government is built from the ground up, with 
bodies elected in local municipalities coming together to appoint national-level 
representation (since 2007 supplemented by additional intermediate regional-level 
governments). However, for all the apparent success in implementing the law, 
numerous authors have questioned whether it was actually adopted with the needs of 
Hungary’s internal minorities primarily in mind. 
Representatives of the relevant minorities clearly did play a part in the 
discussions leading to the law, which they saw as a way of reversing assimilationist 
trends within Hungary that had intensified during the Communist era (Dobos, 2007).  
According to Hungarian political scientist András László Pap, this goal was shared by 
many ethnic Hungarian lawmakers, who were inspired by a sincere desire to 
compensate for the pain and suffering that the ‘traditional’ ethno-national 
communities of the region had had to endure over preceding decades (Pap, 2006, 243-
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7). In its initial incarnation, however, the law has the appearance very much of a top-
down initiative in which the interests of minorities were subordinated to those of the 
state and its dominant ethnic group.  
Due to the small numerical size of domestic minorities, initial post-Communist 
state and nation-building was informed less by concerns over internal stability and 
ethno-cultural justice than it was by the question of negotiating the relationship 
between the state and the large ethnic Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring 
states. When it came to rectifying past suffering, legislators had in mind the 
specifically Hungarian historical experience arising from the 1920 Treaty of Trianon 
and its dismemberment of ethnic Hungarian areas of settlement, the legacy of which 
‘has never disappeared entirely’ (Schöpflin, 2006: 216). This in turn informed a 
‘constitutionally articulated responsibility for out-of-border diaspora Hungarians’ 
within post-1989 Hungary (Pap, 2006: 248), designed to preserve Hungarians as a 
single transborder national community.     
In this regard, most authors would share Pap’s view that Act LXXVII of July 
1993 (adopted with a remarkable 96.5% parliamentary majority vote in favour) was 
intended as a form of ‘trade currency’ in Hungary’s external support for the claims of 
the Hungarian diaspora living in neighbouring states (Pap, 2006: 243).
6
 By making 
itself a pace-setter in the field of minority rights, Hungary would acquire the moral 
legitimacy to ask the same of other countries, while also enhancing its credentials as a 
prospective member of the European Union. Seen from this perspective, a law based 
on the NTA principle had the additional advantage of separating the issue of ethnic 
Hungarian rights from that of territory. This, it was hoped, would position Hungary 
internationally as a purveyor of ‘non-territorial policy innovations’ (Stroschein, 2006: 
55) in the resolution of CEE’s majority/minority issues. Taken together with bilateral 
treaties signed between Hungary and neighbouring states containing Hungarian 
minorities, it would help to press the case for collective minority rights claims while 
undercutting any claims by neighbouring governments that Hungarian autonomy 
constituted a threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
How, then, has the law been interpreted by minorities within Hungary? If one 
looks at the original law from this standpoint, then obvious questions arise regarding 
the representativeness of the autonomous institutions created after 1993. At the time 
the law was adopted, many citizens of Hungary from a minority background were 
reluctant to declare publicly their ethnicity, informed by a collective memory of past 
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ethnically-based oppression during and after World War Two. The original Act 
LXXVII of 1993 thus did not use national registers as a basis for electing minority 
self-governments; rather, participation in elections was open to all citizens residing 
within the relevant electoral district. This approach, however, gave rise to the practice 
generally known as “ethno-business” whereby political entrepreneurs were in some 
cases able to pose as minority representatives simply in order to gain access to public 
office and the entitlements that flow from this (Krizsán, 2000; Dobos, 2007; Vizi, 
2009: 124-6).  
Perceived abuse of the law in this way was one factor behind the 2005 
amendment, which introduced an obligatory system of enrolment on national registers 
for candidates and voters alike. The revised system has been found to comply with 
international standards relating to self-identification and data protection (European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, 2012: 9), and has apparently not adversely 
affected levels of participation in subsequent elections to minority self-governments. 
The underlying basic question of whether it is desirable or defensible for individual 
citizens to publicly register their ethnic affiliation, however, remains one of the 
fundamental discussion points in relation to the NTA model and its ability to ensure 
effective representation of a given minority group. Cited as a key objection in other 
European contexts already prior to World War Two (Smith and Hiden, 2012: 83), use 
of this provision in Hungary must be set against the background of a recent upsurge in 
racism and intolerance against the Roma minority (see below). 
The recent Act CLXXIX on the Rights of Minorities has also sought to address 
the problem of “ethno-business” through recourse to census data: from 2014 (when 
new electoral provisions introduced by the Act will come into force), it will not be 
permissible to organise elections to a minority self-government in a district where the 
2011 census indicates that the given minority group is not present above a defined 
numerical threshold. This provision apparently drew complaints from minority 
representatives who pointed to a lack of prior warning before the census was held 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2012: 10). Once again, this 
issue brings into focus the problem of defining and institutionalising community 
boundaries and belonging through a system of this nature.         
The 2005 amendment to the cultural autonomy law has also been hailed as a 
step forward in addressing what many commentators saw as shortcomings in the 
effectiveness of the minority institutions (ACFC, 2010: 14). Not least, the revised law 
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incorporated firmer guarantees relating to the functional and financial independence 
of minority self-governments, several of which have since been able to establish 
schools and take over the running of other cultural institutions (ACFC, 2010: 23). 
Moreover, in response to external recommendations by the Council of Europe, the 
2011 Act on National Minorities establishes detailed regulations governing the legal 
status and competences of minority self-governments and their rights of advocacy in 
relation to state and municipal authorities, while provisions are now in place for 
minority representation within the national parliament (Act CLXXIX, 2011). Even so, 
periodic monitoring reports allude to a continued lack of clarity regarding the extent 
of resources to be made available to minority self-governments and the modalities for 
accessing them. The recent economic crisis has also brought cuts in funding, which is 
highlighted as a particular issue in relation to Roma self-governments (European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, 2012: 14; ACFC, 2010: 23-24).  
Given that over half of the self-governments established in 1993-2002 operate 
in the name of the Roma minority (Dobos, 2007: 465), particular questions arise 
regarding the extent to which NTA has helped to further the societal integration and 
effective interest representation of what is Hungary’s largest and most marginalised 
minority. In this regard, early criticism of the existing framework pointed to the fact 
that NTA was not embedded within a broader overarching strategy to address issues 
of Roma discrimination and exclusion (Vizi, 2009: 128-131). A more cynical view 
would be to see NTA as a substitute for such a strategy, enabling the state to claim 
symbolically that it was giving rights to the Roma, thereby drawing attention away 
from more substantive issues while simply entrenching pre-existing ethnic boundaries 
within society and encouraging the pursuit of narrow sectional interests by different 
groupings within the Roma ethno-political sphere (Kovats, 1997; 2000). Hungary has 
subsequently been hailed for the establishment of an Equal Treatment Authority in 
2005 and the adoption of a strategic action plan to implement a Decade of Roma 
Integration programme for 2007-2015 (ACFC, 2010). At the same time, there remains 
deep concern over a recent and ongoing upsurge in discrimination and violence 
against Roma. Within this context there would seem to be scope for more detailed 
empirical work examining the activities of Roma self-governments and their role in 
promoting integration as opposed to simple representation of an already marginalised 
culture.    
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If one departs from the premise that Hungary’s 1993 minority law was adopted 
primarily in support of a state-driven homeland nationalist agenda, the question then 
arises as to whether NTA actually constitutes a desirable or viable paradigm for 
accommodating the needs and aspirations of ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring 
states. The model certainly has been a feature of minority political debate and 
practices in these countries, not least in Serbia, where an NTA law has been in place 
since 2009. A detailed discussion of this law falls outside the scope of the present 
article; however, its adoption has clearly been tied up with Serbia’s current aspirations 
for eventual membership in the European Union. From the standpoint of the Serbian 
state and the current sensitive issues relating to its territorial integrity, NTA could 
indeed be seen as a useful means of undermining any potential ethnic Hungarian 
claims focused on control of Vojvodina, which already benefits from devolved 
government. The extent to which the law is actually being enacted to the satisfaction 
of the minority, however, is seemingly open to debate (Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, 
2012: 122-178). 
 
3.2 Non-territorial autonomy and Romania 
Proposals for Hungarian non-territorial autonomy have also been advanced 
periodically within Romania, but have yet to be taken on board by the state. In this 
case, an ethnic Hungarian party (The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, 
UDMR in Romanian) has participated actively in coalition governments since the 
mid-1990s and has on this basis been able to secure minority rights that are far-
reaching by regional standards, including provision for mother-tongue education from 
primary to university level, and public use of the Hungarian language in areas where 
Hungarians make up more than 20% of the local population (Ram, 2009: 182-4). 
More broadly, Romania has introduced a system of reserved seats in parliament for 
eighteen other minority groups which otherwise failed to gain representation and has 
established a Department for Inter-Ethnic Relations, which cooperates with a 
consultative Council of National Minorities drawn from non-governmental 
organization (NGO) representatives (Second Report, 2005: 5-8).    
UDMR has nevertheless faced a growing challenge from smaller parties and 
organisations outside parliament, such as the Szekler National Council, the Hungarian 
Civic Alliance, and the Hungarian National People’s Party of Transylvania. These 
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have accused UDMR of being unduly acquiescent to the agenda of the Romanian 
majority and have advanced demands for more far-reaching recognition, including 
territorial autonomy for the compactly settled Hungarian population in the 
Szeklerland area of Transylvania.
7
 Against this background, UDMR has, since the 
1990s, pursued its own project of fuller cultural autonomy for the Hungarian minority 
(Andreescu, 2001; Kemp, 2006: 116-117); mindful of historically-framed Romanian 
nationalist sensitivities over the status of Transylvania, however, it has framed 
autonomy in non-territorial terms. In early 2005, during the run-up to Romania’s EU 
accession, the party tabled a draft minority law which was informed to some extent by 
historic and contemporary NTA legislation in Estonia (Decker, 2005).
8
 This approach 
was contested by UDMR’s political opponents within the Hungarian community, who 
claimed that the proposed law would give UDMR an effective monopoly on decision-
making. Additional external protection for the Hungarian minority would, they 
argued, only be achieved at the expense of internal democracy (Andreescu, 2007). 
In any event, the draft tabled in 2005 failed to pass. According to the Romanian 
constitution, the status of national minorities is to be regulated by an organic law 
requiring an absolute majority in both houses of the Romanian parliament and this 
proved impossible to achieve (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
2005; Decker, 2008). In this respect, it seems that even proposals for non-territorial 
autonomy could not transcend securitised ‘nationalising’ discourses on state and 
nation-building within Romania, which see any prospect of further Hungarian rights 
as potentially threatening to the integrity of the state (Decker, 2008: 111-12). From an 
EU standpoint, moreover, the absence of such legislation did not prove to be a barrier 
to Romania entering the EU in 2007. As of 2013, a general minority law had still to be 
adopted, with the post-EU accession period having seen a growth in populist 
nationalist rhetoric and political tensions around issues of historical commemoration, 
property restitution, and territorial-administrative boundaries within Transylvania. As 
regards the latter issue, UDMR has argued for the integration of the three Szeklerland 
counties into a single administrative entity, in the face of government proposals to 
amalgamate these into separate regions, each with an overall ethnic Romanian 
majority (Lupea, 2012).  
Ongoing disputes in this area have been exacerbated by the more generalised 
state of upheaval within Romanian politics on the back of the economic crisis, as well 
as by the more assertive homeland nationalist stance adopted by the Orbán 
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government in Hungary following its accession to power in 2010. Especially 
contentious in this regard has been the decision to grant citizenship of Hungary to 
Hungarians living abroad. While the Orbán government has stopped short of 
endorsing the goal of territorial autonomy for Romania’s Hungarians, prominent 
rightist politicians have in recent times argued in favour of this. Such statements, 
coupled with the close ties that exist between Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party and the 
Hungarian Civic Union in Romania, have complicated still further any attempt to 
promote the NTA agenda within Romania, while carrying detrimental implications for 
the situation of Hungarians more generally. In this respect, the Romanian government 
that came to power in May 2012 advocated, among other controversial measures, the 
adoption of a minority law without the chapter on cultural autonomy.
9
   
 
3.3 Non-territorial autonomy in Estonia 
A similar securitised relationship between state, minority and external national 
homeland can be discerned in relation to contemporary Estonia, where NTA was 
reintroduced in 1993 against the background of a state and nation-building project 
predicated on the political marginalisation of the large Russian-speaking settler 
population established during the Soviet era. Within this context—and specifically in 
light of extensive international debates around Estonia’s policy of not giving 
automatic citizenship to Soviet-era settlers and their descendants—it would appear 
that cultural autonomy was re-adopted primarily with an eye to bolstering Estonia’s 
external image and its standing in the eyes of the West. Indeed, legislators openly 
alluded to this ‘propaganda’ function during the parliamentary debates that preceded 
the adoption of the law in 1993 (Smith, 2000: 34; Shiryaev, 2009; Aidarov and 
Drechsler, 2011). In terms of legacies, this legislation connected symbolically with 
the 1920s ‘Golden Age’ of democracy, which constituted a usable past in the context 
of the early 1990s’ ‘Return to Europe’. Above all, it could be held up as proof that the 
titular nationality had traditionally taken a tolerant attitude towards national minorities 
living within Estonia (Smith, 2000; Shiryaev, 2009). 
The actual practical relevance of the 1993 legislation is more open to question. 
The law provides for the establishment of NTA by the ‘historic’ German, Jewish, 
Russian and Swedish minorities and by any other recognised minority group 
numbering more than three thousand. It is based on the original Renner and Bauer 
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premise of individual citizens freely opting to affiliate themselves to a national 
register set up by representatives of the given minority. Under the terms of Estonia’s 
1992 citizenship law, however, a significant proportion of the country’s diverse 
minority population has remained without full citizenship and, as such, has not been 
eligible to participate in the establishment and governance of NTA institutions. This 
fact has meant that representatives from a number of minority categories have not 
been in a position to implement the law (Berg, 2003). Beyond this, minority 
representatives have pointed to a lack of political will on the part of successive 
Estonian governments to enact the NTA concept in full, highlighting numerous 
deficiencies in the existing law and the need for additional regulations that would 
permit the establishment of fully-fledged minority cultural self-governments. In this 
respect, for instance, representatives of Estonia’s 13,000-strong Ingrian Finnish 
minority were able to establish a national register as early as 1998, but had to wait a 
further six years before a framework was in place to elect an Ingrian Finnish cultural 
council (the legislative arm of NTA). This council, however, has not been able to elect 
a minority self-government, since there are still no legal provisions governing the 
public-legal status of such an entity. This state of affairs has limited the possibilities 
for minority cultural development through NTA structures (Berg, 2003; Kabanen, 
2006). 
The establishment of fully-functioning minority cultural self-governments with 
public-legal status would imply a larger financial commitment on the part of state and 
municipal governments. Beyond this consideration, state representatives have 
apparently alluded informally to a fear that the attainment of non-territorial autonomy 
might lead in turn to more far-reaching demands for territorial autonomy (Kabanen, 
2006). Such concerns would appear to be especially relevant in the case of the 
numerically large (nearly 30% of the overall population) and compactly settled 
Russian minority, which, in the dominant nation-building discourse of the past two 
decades, has routinely been cast as a potential domestic extension of an external 
security threat from the Russian Federation. In this regard, the original parliamentary 
debates on cultural autonomy from 1993 make it clear that the current law was not 
devised with the large Russian minority in mind, while several speakers also 
expressed anxiety over the clause within the law that allows institutions of cultural 
autonomy to receive financial subventions from overseas (Smith, 2000). At least two 
applications to establish institutions of Russian cultural autonomy have been 
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submitted to the state authorities since 2006, but neither has been approved (Aidarov 
and Drechsler, 2011).  
In the first of these applications, NTA was explicitly couched as a means of 
uniting the Russian population politically in order to counteract what was seen as 
growing alienation from the national and local electoral process and thereby further 
the representation of specific Russian minority interests within state structures.
10
 This 
political aim can be seen as running counter to the understanding of NTA enshrined in 
the 1993 law, which is supposed to provide for management solely of cultural 
activities within terms set by the state and (implicitly) representatives of its dominant 
ethnicity.
11
 The current framework set by the state envisages the integration of the 
Russian-speaking minority into a common societal core, as part of the project of 
constructing a unitary nation-state. The network of Russian-language schools 
inherited from the Soviet era has continued to operate since 1991 under the auspices 
of local municipalities.
12
 Under current educational legislation, however, municipal 
authorities are obliged to implement a phased transition to bilingual education (60% 
Estonian to 40% Russian) at upper secondary level (Grades 10-12, age 16-19).  
One of the central arguments advanced in favour of NTA is that it would allow 
a Russian minority cultural self-government to retain and administer a full system of 
purely Russian-language schools, using continued funding from state and municipal 
authorities.
13
 While the then Minister for Nationalities gave a tentative welcome to the 
initial 2006 proposals to establish Russian cultural autonomy, it is far from clear 
whether such a development would be in accord with the objectives of the current 
strategy on integration, especially in a societal context where many Russians—even 
among the younger generation—still have an incomplete knowledge of Estonian as 
the sole official state language.
14
  
Available evidence also suggests that Russian-speaking society within Estonia 
is itself divided over the best way forward: as already mentioned, many aspects 
relating to the administration and financing of NTA (including the relationship to the 
state and to existing municipal authorities) have still to be clarified in law, meaning 
that there is no certainty as to whether existing levels of state support would be 
maintained under this system. Many Russian-speakers are seemingly willing to accept 
the transition to bilingualism under existing municipal auspices, with the main point 
of debate relating to the speed at which the transformation should take place; others 
argue for reversion to the status quo ante, asking why, as taxpayers, they should not 
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continue to enjoy a full system of Russian-language educational provision under the 
direct auspices of the state.
15
 A further strand would see non-territorial cultural 
autonomy as offering insufficient recognition of Russians’ status within Estonia, and 
thus continue to argue for full territorial-political autonomy of the kind advocated by 
Soviet-era elites in Estonia’s Russophone north-east during 1990-93.16 In light of 
these divisions, numerous commentators (both ethnically Estonian and ethnically 
Russian) have questioned whether those advancing the NTA project are in fact 
genuinely representative of the minority in whose name they purport to speak, 
prompting claims that the Russian population is simply ‘too large’ to be 
accommodated by a framework of this kind, and that the scheme would serve only to 
introduce new lines of in-group division and dissension.
17
 
 
3.4 Non-territorial autonomy in the Russian Federation 
If Estonian perceptions and experiences of NTA can be situated within what is 
essentially a modernist agenda of state and nation-building, the adoption of this model 
by the Russian Federation during the 1990s followed a more avowedly multicultural 
logic rooted in differing legacies and reception of the Soviet past. Specifically, the 
1996 NCA Act was introduced as part of a new Conception of State National Policy 
designed to inculcate ‘multicultural constitutional patriotism’, i.e. an overarching 
civic conception of nationhood encompassing all inhabitants of the Federation 
(Codagnone and Filippov, 2000). In this respect, the existing model of ethno-
territorial federalism inherited from the USSR was seen to have a number of 
limitations. First, as already noted above, this system was not seen to accommodate 
adequately all of the ethno-national groups living within the Federation. A second 
issue was a concern that within the destabilising context of 1990s economic and 
political transformation, the inherited territorial federalist model might undermine the 
overall integrity of the state. In August 1990, during his struggle with the Soviet 
leadership, Boris Yeltsin had famously invited Russia’s national republics ‘to take all 
sovereignty they could swallow’ (Marsh, 2005: 55). With a number of republican 
leaders taking Yeltsin at his word, the post-Soviet period saw the emergence of a 
separatist conflict in Chechnya and a constitutional dispute between the Federal 
Government and Tatarstan. Given the recent experience of the fall of the USSR, fears 
arose of a continued trend towards ‘matrioshka nationalism’ that might lead to the 
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unravelling of the newly-established Federation (Taras, 1993; Taras, 1997). The 
overall picture that emerged in the 1990s was one of asymmetrical federalism, 
whereby local leaders indeed sought to grab as much power and resources as possible, 
to the detriment of overall state cohesion. There were also concerns over trends 
towards ‘nationalising’ practices at the level of the national republics that might 
provoke local level horizontal conflicts between different ethnicities inhabiting these 
territories.  
It was against this background that the new state conception and the NCA law 
were launched in June 1996. These were associated first and foremost with Valerii 
Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences from 1989 and Nationalities Minister of the Russian Federation 
during 1992. Tishkov never proposed the abolition of territorial autonomy: the 1996 
Conception made it clear that NCA was to be a complement to the system of national 
republics, the constitutional position of which remained unchanged (Codagnone and 
Filippov, 2000: 277; Tolz, 2001: 251; see also Bowring, 2002: 240-1). All the same, 
he clearly hoped that NCA would serve as a counterbalance to the republics and thus 
help to limit ‘from below’ the power of ‘ethnocratic’ elites within these territories 
(Codagnone and Filippov, 2000: 276). Overall, the conception was notable for its 
emphasis on consolidating ‘a civic and spiritual-ethical community of all Russia’ and 
its lack of any reference to the role of ethno-territorial autonomy in this regard 
(Codagnone and Filippov, 2000: 276-8). Especially revealing is perhaps Yeltsin’s 
address to the opening session of Russia’s parliament in 1994, which asserted that ‘no 
single ethnic group can possess an exclusive right to control over territory, political 
institutions, and resources’.18 
Writing in 2000, Codagogne and Filipov claimed that the new state conception 
of nationality policy had been negatively received by leaders in many of the 
established territorial republics, who had portrayed this as a strategy of ‘divide and 
rule’ designed to promote a long-term policy of assimilation. In this regard, they 
asserted, republican leaders tried to draw a line of continuity back to the old Soviet-
era rhetoric about ‘fusion’ of the USSR’s manifold nationalities into a new ‘Soviet 
people’, portraying this as an overtly assimilationist rather than simply integrationist 
policy (Codagnone and Filippov, 2000: 283). Yet the practical experience of NTA, 
both in the 1990s and subsequently, suggests that this view is in need of qualification. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, existing territorially-based authorities have not 
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sought to block the establishment of national-cultural autonomies within their 
territories; on the contrary, it seems that they have viewed this as a key means of 
bolstering their own legitimacy and power base at the regional level (Osipov, 2010: 
45). More broadly, it would seem that, for all the early 1990s talk of ‘matrioshka 
nationalism’, fears of continued territorial fragmentation and centre-periphery conflict 
within Russia have been greatly exaggerated, and that Russia’s ‘stateness’ has proved 
to be far more robust than many predicted at the outset.
19
  
A more salient issue with regard to NTA—and to Russia’s ‘multicultural 
constitutional patriotism’ project more generally—arguably concerns the growing 
centralisation of state power over the course of the past decade and the prospect of 
increased pressure both from advocates of a unitary and ethnically neutral approach to 
state and nation-building and from more ‘nationalising’ forces adhering to an overtly 
ethnic Russian conception of nationhood (Codagnone and Filippov, 2000: 284). In 
light of these centralising trends, Bill Bowring claimed that by 2006, ten years on 
from the adoption of the NCA law, Russia was ‘witnessing the end of a fascinating 
but doomed experiment’ (Bowring, 2008: 95). While the number of NCAs at various 
levels in Russia has continued to grow, from 504 in 2005 to 717 by January 2009 
(Osipov, 2010: 42), one can question what practical social and political role these 
institutions actually perform within contemporary Russia. As Bowring has observed, 
the new bodies of NCA have possessed little in the way of actual powers and 
resources, to the extent that there was little if anything to differentiate them from pre-
existing NGOs (Bowring, 2005: 203; Osipov, 2004).  
Alexander Osipov echoes this assessment in a more recent article, pointing to 
the ‘puzzling’ fact that there is so much demand to establish NCAs when they 
apparently do so little. Perhaps equally curious is the fact that few commentators, be 
they state officials, ethnic activists, or academics, have routinely drawn attention to 
the practical limitations of the NTA model, but have rather continued to discuss the 
issue in highly abstract terms. This state of affairs leads Osipov to the conclusion that 
NCA has a largely symbolic function within a Russian context that is still heavily 
shaped by ethnicised, ‘groupist’ understandings of political participation. In the latter 
regard, Osipov goes on to suggest, NCA has served to divert attention away from 
issues of equality and non-discrimination, allowing the authorities to explain 
‘exclusion and conflicts in terms of cultural differences rather than institutional 
deficiencies and social deprivation’ (Osipov, 2010: 54). 
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Conclusion 
The last two decades have certainly seen a growing interest by international 
organisations in the potential of non-territorial autonomy as a modality of minority 
rights provision in the New Europe. One of the key drivers of this interest have been 
developments on the ground in CEE, where NTA laws are in place in several states 
and under discussion in several more. To date, however, there has been very little by 
way of systematic in-depth comparison of how NTA is being debated, implemented 
and experienced within these settings: as Alexander Osipov has remarked in one rare 
preliminary overview of the various cases, the literature on contemporary NTA still 
tends to focus on the political-philosophical dimensions of the concept, with an accent 
on what should be done rather than on what actually exists (Osipov, 2010: 30).
 
This 
article has sought to make a contribution in this regard by assessing the Central and 
East European experience of NTA through the analytical lenses of state and nation-
building on the one hand and, on the other, democratisation and political participation. 
It has been argued that, in the still securitised ethnopolitical environment of this post-
Communist “transitional” region, issues of state and nation-building have been 
accorded the highest priority both by state governments and by international 
governmental organisations. 
If one looks at the various cases through the lens of state and nation-building, 
then Russia’s promotion of NTA can be understood as an attempt to enhance the 
loyalty of those numerous groups that lack territorial recognition of their nationality, 
while reining in the power of ethnocratic elites at the level of the sub-state national-
territorial republics. By these measures, the NTA experiment can be seen to have been 
successful, connecting as it does with inherited Soviet-era understandings of 
nationality and nationality rights (Bowring, 2002; Osipov, 2010). Whereas the 
Russian state agenda was concerned mainly with bolstering internal stability and 
cohesion, the espousal of NTA by the smaller and far more ethnically homogeneous 
Republic of Hungary was seemingly driven primarily by considerations of external 
homeland nationalism, which has sought to promote ways of preserving the cultural 
identity of Hungarian kin minorities in situ, thereby maintaining the unity of a supra-
state Hungarian nation without revisiting established territorial borders or encouraging 
large-scale population movement to Hungary. The NTA model has clearly found 
some resonance among policymakers in neighbouring Serbia, which—like Russia—
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inherited a Communist legacy of institutionalised territorial autonomy and was thus 
keen to strengthen the integrity of the state. In the case of Romania, by contrast, 
efforts to promote NTA have so far proved unable to transcend strong inherited 
attachments to unitary nation-statehood.  
Similarly, in Estonia suggestions that the revival of the NTA law might serve as 
a model for resolving latent ethnopolitical tensions have proved displaced. In the 
strongly nationalising political context of the 1990s and beyond, the state and its 
dominant ethnic majority continues to view the prospect of national-cultural 
autonomy for Russians in particular as a potential threat to the sovereignty and 
integrity of the restored nation-state. In this regard, the dominant political discourse 
has framed the Russian minority as threatening not just to state security, but also to 
the societal security of the majority ethno-national group. The numerically small size 
of the ethnic Estonian population and the Russifying trends of the late Soviet era 
mean that promotion of the titular language and culture has become a central 
preoccupation within the state and nation-building process. This immediately 
undermines any suggestion that the Russian language should be given more 
substantive public recognition beyond the parameters currently set by the state. Yet, 
as noted above, the deficiencies of the 1993 NTA law have also been highlighted by 
other smaller non-Russian minorities in Estonia whose perspectives for cultural 
development are more obviously linked to a non-territorial model of organisation and 
which lack the inherited territorially-based provisions for native-language education 
currently enjoyed by the Russian minority. In the final analysis, it would seem that the 
adoption of NTA was primarily viewed as an exercise in image-building and that the 
law in its present form lacks any real practical relevance. 
The discussions about Hungarians in Central Europe and Russians in the Baltic 
states in particular exemplify a continued tendency to view minorities as an ‘anomaly’ 
and impediment to successful state and nation-building in the region, rather than as a 
resource which could make a positive contribution to this process. The experience of 
the past twenty years, however, suggests that fears of widespread and protracted 
ethnopolitical conflict and instability—so prevalent during the period immediately 
after the wars in Yugoslavia—have in fact been hugely exaggerated and that this 
remains the case today even within the new, more uncertain context of economic 
crisis and heightened nationalism. In light of this, there would seem to be a strong 
case for shifting the analytical focus away from macro-political, state-centric 
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perspectives and engaging more thoroughly with minorities as actors in their own 
right (as opposed to mere objects of host state or external homeland policy) and with 
the outlooks and agendas that they bring to the current construction of state political 
communities and processes of Europeanisation within the region.
20
  
Not least, such an approach would help to assess the claim (central to advocacy 
of the NTA model) of a paradigm shift that has moved contemporary minority politics 
away from claims to territory towards demands more focused on recognition of 
language and practice of culture (Nimni, 2010). As regards NTA specifically, this 
suggested approach invites a closer examination of how the practice of autonomy 
(where it exists) is shaping the construction of minority identities and political 
agendas and (in cases where NTA remains an aspiration rather than a reality) the 
extent to which the model could serve as a viable paradigm for addressing the needs 
and agendas articulated by minority representatives. Of course, in this regard one 
cannot assume that NTA is necessarily seen as an optimum model: as can be seen 
from the Estonian example discussed here (and also to a lesser extent from the case of 
Hungarians in Romania), it is not just ethnic majorities but also minorities that need to 
be convinced of the merits of the approach.
21
    
This call for a finer-grained examination of minority practices and debates 
“from the ground up” would seem equally apposite when discussing the credentials of 
NTA in terms of democratisation and participation in public life. As discussed in this 
article, the legislation adopted in Hungary and Russia during the 1990s has led to a 
veritable mushrooming of NTA institutions within these two states. Existing studies, 
however, have questioned the extent to which these new structures adequately 
represent minority interests and enhance participation in public life. Dobos (2007) 
claims that this is the case in relation to the Hungarian law,
22
 but other studies of both 
Hungary and Russia have pointed to the limited powers of autonomy bodies as well as 
to an absence of effective overarching frameworks for minority integration and 
representation within which institutions and practices of NTA can be embedded 
(Kovats, 1997; Kovats, 2000; Vizi, 2009; Bowring, 2008; Osipov, 2010). In this 
respect, critics would see NTA as working towards a ‘normalising’ agenda set by the 
state, which frames minority rights as a question of culture and preserving cultural 
distinctiveness while diverting attention away from issues of social equality and cross-
ethnic interaction within civil society. This critique is compounded by questions 
around the representativeness of NTA institutions and the extent to which self-
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declared ethnic elites can claim to speak adequately for the complex diverse range of 
perspectives and interests found within minority communities. In so far as NTA 
bodies (established on the basis of free affiliation to national cadastres or registers) act 
as the main conduit for the representation of minority interests to state and municipal 
authorities, what then becomes of those left outside these structures? As noted above, 
this has been one of the key areas of debate surrounding proposals for Russian 
national-cultural autonomy in Estonia. 
Once again, however, this critique suggests a preoccupation with what should 
exist (at least in the eyes of the critics) as opposed to what actually exists in practice. 
The very fact that institutions of NTA have proliferated so rapidly in states like 
Hungary and Russia suggests a need for closer attention to the kind of spaces minority 
representatives are carving out for their own activity. What understandings of identity 
and ‘minority rights’, for instance, do these representatives bring to bear and what 
agendas do they seek to pursue through the institutions of NTA? How is the 
institutionalisation of minority ethnicity through NTA institutions shaping interactions 
with the state and broader society in which these institutions are embedded (and, 
where relevant, with the ‘external homeland’ to which the group is discursively and 
practically affiliated)? What implication does this hold for political community-
building? Can one assume anymore a linear progression to western-style sovereign 
nation-statehood in the region, or are we, within a globalising context, looking at the 
emergence of alternative forms of political communality not predicated on the classic 
nation-state logic? Only through a more micro-level engagement with actually 
existing cases of NTA, I would say, can one truly unlock the ‘puzzle’ that Osipov 
identifies with regard to Russia, and which appears equally relevant in the Hungarian 
case: namely, if cultural autonomy has so little practical impact or significance, why 
have so many cultural self-governments been established? 
An engagement of this kind would also be consistent with recent developments 
(exemplified by Rogers Brubaker’s work) in the study of nationhood and national 
identity that urge us to move away from substantivist understandings of group and 
groupness and to treat these not as a category of analysis but as a category of practice 
(Brubaker, 1996: 13-21; Brubaker, 2004). In this regard, Brubaker’s latest co-
authored study urges us to pay attention to the top-down ways in which nationhood 
and other social categories are ‘institutionalised, discursively articulated [and …] 
embedded in culturally powerful and symbolically resonant myths, memories and 
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narratives’, but also to ‘the ways in which [those who are] categorised appropriate, 
internalise, subvert, evade, or transform the categories that are imposed on them’ 
(Brubaker, et al. 2006: 10). In saying this, Brubaker et al. follow Eric Hobsbawm’s 
celebrated observation that ‘nations and nationalism are constructed from above, [but] 
can only be fully understood from below, in terms of the needs and expectations of 
ordinary people, which are often not national, still less nationalist’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 
10). 
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22. This was also the impression gained by the present author during an informal preliminary 
discussion with representatives of a Roma self-government in Hungary during late 2011. 
While underlining the profound problems (both in terms of resources and of societal 
attitudes) faced by those seeking to promote Roma integration and drawing attention to 
deficiencies in the NCA law, these representatives nevertheless emphasized the valuable 
advocacy function that their government were able to perform in relation to existing state 
authorities, as well as work in schools that had boosted Roma educational attainment and 
employment prospects. 
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